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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent, Tatsumi Misaka, through his counsel of record, 
petitions the Court for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, on the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S OPINION IMPROPERLY CONSTRUES THE SIGNATURE 
REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-503 
A "signature" is required under Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 in 
order for a person to validly execute a holographic will. The 
requirement of a signature could be used to accomplish a variety 
of purposes, not all of which are consistent with the existing 
legislative intent to allow a will to be signed in the body of the 
document. The signature requirement could act to identify the 
testator and to prevent fraud due to the difficulty of forging a 
signature. The signature requirement could further act to show 
the testator's understanding of the importance and legal signifi-
cance which accompanies a will, and that the testator intends the 
document, whether or not presently completed, to be his will. 
Finally, the signature requirement could act to show the finality 
of the instrument or to protect against deletions of portions of 
the will. 
In its Opinion in this case, this Court interpreted the 
signature requirement of the Utah statute as including the purpose 
of showing the finality of the will: 
"The purpose of our statutory scheme is to 
1 
require a course of conduct which assures that 
a person's will is reduced to handwriting, and 
when handwritten, that the intention is to have 
the writing take legal effect be indicated by 
a signature which records the fact. The signa-
ture requirement shows that the writer finally 
approved the writing and meant for it to be 
operative as a testamentary instrument." 
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 66 (Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 1988). 
This interpretation would be consistent with a statute 
requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is inconsistent 
with the Utah Uniform Probate Code ("UUPC") which allows a 
signature in the body of the will. "There is no requirement that 
the testator's name be at the end of the will; thus, if he writes 
his name in the body of the will and intends it to be his 
signature, this would satisfy the statute." Editorial Board 
Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code. 
In allowing wills to be signed in the body, the UUPC 
implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the signature act to 
show the finality of a will. A will which is signed in the body 
is necessarily signed before the written language of the will is 
complete. Thus, the "signature" requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-503 should not be construed to mean that the handwritten 
name must be placed on the will to show a final approval of the 
completed document. Imposing a requirement of a specific intent 
that the handwritten name in the body of the will be put there 
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for the purpose of authenticating the completed will defeats 
legislative intent of allowing a will to be signed in the body, 
and also defeats the broad purpose of the Uniform Probate Code to 
"validate wills whenever possible." General Comment to Part 5, 
Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform Probate Code. 
The Court Opinion implies further that the signature require-
ment under the UUPC is also intended to protect against deletions. 
"Without more, it is an inadequate guard against writing being 
deleted..." Erickson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66. Again, such a 
purpose is consistent only with a will statute requiring a 
signature at the end. The intent of the UUPC to allow a will to 
be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the purposes for 
the signature requirement do not include safeguarding the will 
against deletions, because a signature in the body of the will 
does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature at 
the end would. 
The record reflects no evidence to indicate that cards were 
deleted in the present case, nor does it reflect where the 
holographic document was found or the circumstances in which it 
was found. Appellant indicated in oral argument and the Opinion 
reflects that the cards were discovered in a desk drawer along 
with other belongings of decedent. If the Court finds this to be 
relevant even though not in the record, the Court should also 
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allow additional evidence to be presented by Mr. Misaka to show 
that he was not in a position to delete additional cards because 
the holographic document was found by the Personal Representative 
of the Estate or members of decedent's family, and then brought 
to Mr. Misaka's attention by the Personal Representative. 
While the Utah statute does not support a requirement that the 
signature act to show finality or to guard against deletions, the 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 indicates that 
"signatureff should mean something more than just the testator's 
handwritten name. The purpose of the signature requirement under 
the UUPC should be to show the testator's understanding of the 
legal significance of the act he is undertaking, that is, the act 
of making a will. Thus, the signature requirement should be 
construed to validate wills containing the testator's handwritten 
name in the will body in a context which demonstrates the 
testator's operative intent for the language to follow, showing 
the testator's understanding of the importance and legal 
significance of the document being prepared. The holographic 
document at issue meets that requirement and should be validated. 
A handwritten name in the document for purposes of identifying 
property would not meet that requirement. See, Nelson v. Texar-
kana Historical Soc'y and Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 
(1974); In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952) 
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(dissent of J. Traynor). A handwritten name in an exordium clause 
clearly indicating that the document to follow is a will, however, 
would meet that standard and should constitute a signature unless 
the writer otherwise demonstrated that he did not consider the 
will effective without further signing the will. This con-
struction is not contrary to the general statutory definition of 
"signature11 contained in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-12(2)(r) (Supp. 
1988) because the language preceding that definition provides that 
lf[T]he following definitions shall be observed, unless the 
definition would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute." Id. at 
§68-3-12(2). 
The courts of other jurisdictions have generally reached 
conclusions consistent with the above standard. In Smith v. 
McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) the court validated 
the will which began "I, Julian Leland Rutherford...do hereby 
make, publish and declare this to be my last will and 
testament..." The same court, in Nelson v. Texarkana Historical 
Socfy and Museum, 257 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 882 (1972) found the 
signature requirement not met where the testator's handwritten 
name only appeared in the context of stating that certain property 
was given in memory of the testator. The California Supreme Court 
has adopted a standard even broader than the proposed standard, 
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finding that intent to sign can be shown by the handwritten name 
of the testator in the phrase "Bonds belonging solely to Helene 
I. Bloch." In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 
(1952). Two of the cases cited by the Court in Footnote 3 of the 
Opinion to support the position that in proper circumstances a 
handwritten name in the body of the will could be written with the 
intent to be a signature actually found the handwritten names to 
be signatures without any evidence except language in the will 
supporting the testator's operative intent for the document. See 
In re Estate of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) 
and Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964). These cases 
support the proposed standard rather than the standard adopted by 
the Court. The conclusion of the court in Estate of Fegley, 42 
Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978) is consistent with the proposed 
standard because the format of the will, containing a blank 
signature space followed by an attestation clause, indicated that 
the testator intended to take further action to validate the will. 
POINT II 
THE HOLOGRAPHIC DOCUMENT MEETS THE SIGNATURE 
STANDARD ADOPTED BY THE COURT 
Even if the Court does not revise the signature requirement 
set out in its Opinion, the holographic document at issue should 
be found to meet that requirement. The will at issue begins in 
blue ink as follows: 
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Last Will & Test 
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I 
leave and bequeath to the following persons of 
my family and others.,.. 
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the 
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink. 
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third 
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined 
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand 
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being 
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the begin-
ning of the words "Last Will & Test". 
The Court has improperly given no weight to the language 
immediately surrounding the Testator's handwritten name in the 
exordium clause. The language "I Robert E. Erickson do hereby 
state that I leave and bequeath..." immediately underneath the 
title "Last Will & Test," shows clear operative intent that the 
document he was preparing served as his will. The Testator could 
hardly have expressed his intent more clearly. The language "do 
hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate the 
will with the handwritten name which immediately precedes those 
words. The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten 
name in an exordium clause to be evidence of an intent to validate 
or authenticate the will by placing the name in that context. See 
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Smith v, McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972), and In re 
Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d (1952) (dissent of J. 
Traynor). 
In addition to the language in the exordium, the Testator came 
back after the fact and dated the document, thereby acknowledging 
and adopting the handwritten name in the exordium clause as his 
signature. The subsequent dating of the will indicates that Mr. 
Erickson had completed the will and done everything he intended 
to do. Case law supports the concept of a person "adopting" a 
prior handwritten name as a signature. In In re Kinney's Estate, 
16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the court found the signature 
adopted based on the will being "complete." The court said that 
a will was not complete if it appeared from the instrument that 
the decedent had not "done everything they intended to do." See 
also, Estate of McCarty, 27 Cal. Rptr. 94, 211 Cal. App.2d 23 
(1962) (signature adopted by underlining at later date). Thus, 
even if the Court retains the legal standard for a signature 
contained in its Opinion, the decision of the trial court should 
be affirmed because the Respondent met its prima facia burden of 
proof that the will contained the Testator's signature. 
The Court Opinion reads into the statute a specific intent 
requirement that the testator's handwritten name be "written with 
the intent that it operate as an authentication of the document 
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as a will" to accompany the general intent requirement that 
testamentary intent be present. Erickson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
66. Reaching the conclusion that a person intended an entire 
document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, but that 
the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign the will 
is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the UUPC to 
validate wills whenever possible. In Estate of Black, 641 P.2d 
754 (1982), the California Supreme Court stated: 
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute 
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts 
should not adopt, upon purely technical reason-
ing, a construction which would result in 
invalidating such wills in half the cases. 
If the handwritten name must be placed in the will with the 
specific intent of authenticating the completed document as a 
will, then the existence of testamentary intent should allow an 
inference to be drawn that a name written in the body of the will 
was done with the intent that it be a signature and authenticate 
the document. The trial court found the existence of testamentary 
intent regarding the holographic document at issue, based on 
extrinsic evidence as well as the document itself. That 
testamentary intent infers the existence of the decedent's intent 
that his handwritten name was placed in exordium clause to 
authenticate the will, especially in light of the surrounding 
language in the exordium clause. 
9 
The Court's Opinion addresses several aspects of the hologra-
phic document which should bear no weight as to either the issue 
of whether the will contains a signature or the issue of testamen-
tary intent. In addition to the discussion below, Respondent's 
Brief previously filed addresses the nature of the holographic 
document at pages 18-21. The fact that the will is written on the 
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack of 
either intent to sign or testamentary intent. The relevant 
inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains the 
writing. This Court has recognized that immaterial language on 
pre-printed forms can be ignored in validating holographic wills. 
Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In the 
same manner, the use of the lined or the unlined side of the cards 
is irrelevant. 
The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other 
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent. The 
Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in In re Love's Estate, 
75 Utah 342, 285 P.299 (1930), stating that several loose or 
detached sheets may serve as a will if, as is the present case, 
the sheets can be coherently read together as a will and contain 
nothing out of harmony with the general conception of a will. The 
present cards meet that standard. 
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The Court states that the nature of the cards suggest that the 
cards are unfinished or constitute a draft. By allowing laymen 
to prepare holographic wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on 
carrying out the testator's intent rather than on the form of the 
instrument. Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is 
crude, but that crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a 
valid holographic will. The fact that the first card was subse-
quently dated indicates that the cards were completed. Nothing 
in the cards indicates that the decedent intended to take any 
further action to complete the will. The mere fact that the 
decedent could have disposed of additional property if he chose 
to do so does not support a conclusion that the will is 
incomplete, especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked 
by the holographic document at issue. Even if the cards were not 
completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC to validate 
wills whenever possible should support validating a will which 
otherwise meets the statutory requirements. In the present case, 
the clear language of the exordium clause and the subsequent 
dating are far better evidence of the testator's intent to sign 
the will than the rough nature of the documents. 
In regard to the possibility that the cards were a "draft," 
an intent to later prepare a more formal document does not 
preclude or detract from the testator's intent in regard to an 
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earlier document* In re Kutter's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322, 
325, P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Term. App. 66, 
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 
456, 461 (W.Va. 1982). 
POINT III 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT BASED 
ON ISSUES NOT RAISED BY DEFENDANT 
As stated by the Court in its Opinion in this case, "the 
parties and the court below seem to have focused on the broader 
issue of whether decedent intended these cards to be his will...," 
Erickson, 98 Utah. Adv. Rep. at 66, and "[T]he findings and 
conclusions entered by the trial court, as well as the appellate 
briefs for both parties, fail to distinguish intent for these two 
different purposes." Id. at 67 fn. 2. 
At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate, the 
Appellant herein, raised only the issue that testamentary intent 
did not exist regarding the will. (R-128-175). See specifically 
the Personal Representative's argument for dismissal following Mr. 
Misaka's evidence (R 147-150) and closing argument (R 171-173). 
In arguing that testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal 
Representative did cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 
P.2d 21 (1952) regarding affixing the signature with intent to 
authenticate (R-148), but did so only as part of his argument that 
testamentary intent was lacking. Further, while the issue was 
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also addressed in the Personal Representatives discussion of 
points (R 106-111), that document was filed some 17 days after 
trial and 12 days after the Court's Order (R 104), and contained 
no legal authority on the issue except a citation to 19 ALR.2d 
926. The Personal Representative's brief addresses directly only 
the issue of testamentary intent, while in that discussion 
addressing intent to authenticate as part of that overall 
testamentary intent. 
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based on 
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for 
the first time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised 
to reverse the trial court's decision. See, e.g., Traynor v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). As this Court stated in 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987): 
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or 
reasonably discernable from the pleadings, 
affidavits, and exhibits will not be 
considered." Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 
P.2d 835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even 
if pleadings are generously interpreted, if 
they are not supported by any factual showing 
or by the submission of legal authority, they 
are not presented for decision. 
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In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to 
clearly raise the issue falls within the perimeters of James v. 
Preston, and should not be considered by this Court on appeal. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent Tatsumi Misaka, prays that the Court 
grant this Petition for Rehearing and revise its Opinion to affirm 
the trial court's judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this Z£) day of January, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
UJ1 
KEN IK JONES 
Attorney^ for Respondent, 
Tatsumi Misaka 
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